Email:
pia_schneider[at]berkeley[dot]edu
Mailing Address:
Philosophy Department
University of California, Berkeley
314 Philosophy Hall, MC 2390
Berkeley, CA 94720-2390
I am a PhD candidate in Philosophy at the University of California, Berkeley.
My primary research is on Kant's Theoretical Philosophy. I am also interested in the Modern Period more generally, in Aesthetics, and in Feminism.
Aside from my research I spend much of my time looking at art (all kinds, though especially contemporary art) and watching films (some of my all time favorites are Claire Denis' Beau Travail, Paul Thomas Anderson's There Will be Blood, and Wong Kar-Wai's Happy Together).
Education
PhD in Philosophy , University of California, Berkeley, expected May 2026
M.A. in Logic and Philosophy of Science, Ludwig-Maximilians University, Munich, 2016
B.A. in German Studies, minor in Philosophy, Johannes Gutenberg University, Mainz, 2013
Area of Specialization
Kant's Theoretical Philosophy
Areas of Competence
Early Modern Philosophy, Aesthetics, Feminism
Stipends, Fellowships, and Awards
• Berkeley Connect Fellowhsip, UC Berkeley, 2025-26
• Summer Dissertation Writing Grant, UC Berkeley, Summer 2023
• Summer Stipend, Freie Universität, Summer 2023
• Travel Stipend for Summer School on the History of Space, Max Planck Institute, Summer 2023
• Travel Stipend, American Philosophy Association, Spring 2023
• Outstanding Graduate Student Instructor Award, UC Berkeley, Spring 2021
• Summer Stipend, UC Berkeley, Summer 2020
• Dissertation Completion Fellowship, UC Berkeley, 2019–2020
• Travel Stipend for Summer School on Kant, Mainz, Summer 2019
• Travel Stipend for Conference on Matter Theory on the Enlightenment, Duke, November 2018
• Travel Stipend for Summer School on Logic, Stockholm, November 2018
• Summer Stipend, University of Haifa, Summer 2018
• Summer Stipend, UC Berkeley, Summer 2017
• Ralph W. Church Fellowship, UC Berkeley, 2016–2017
My research focuses on Kant's theoretical philosophy. I am especially interested in the role that Kant sees space playing for our understanding of reality. Kant argues for such a role in the Critique of Pure Reason, when he claims that space is the form of our sensibility, our capacity to be affected by objects.
I show how we gain insights into the role of space for our understanding by focusing on Kant's discussions of what he calls incongruent counterparts. These are objects that are similar in shape and equal in size, but which cannot be superimposed. An example is the pair of our left and right hand. (So, note that your left hand is pretty much of the same size as our right. And they seem to have the same shape (e.g., for every feature that I can point out on my left hand, I can find an exact corresponding one on my right, and vice versa). But they cannot be superimposed - for example, in most cases a left-hand glove does not fit onto a right hand.)
In my dissertation I explain how these objects reveal the role of space for how we conceptualize objects. I show that incongruent counterparts reveal that space as a unity makes a difference to the possibility of objects. This, I explain further, motviates the view that we conceptualize objects as parts of a common world.
I also show the signifiance of this view by contrasting it (as Kant himself does) to the view held by Leibniz. According to Leibniz, space need not figure into our conception of objects. And so Leibniz thinks that we conceptualize objects not as parts of one world, but as being independent of one another. The problem with such a view is that it leads to an impoverished conception of an object. Though it can capture objects in their logical possibility, it cannot capture objects in their real possibility.
The following are abstracts for some papers that grow out of my dissertation research:
1. "Constructing a Counterpart" (draft available upon request)
In his essay On the First Ground of the Distinction of Regions in Space from 1768 Kant argues that absolute space has a reality of its own, independent of bodies and as a ground of the compositeness of matter. Part of his argument is based on incongruent counterparts, objects that are similar in shape and equal in size, but which cannot be superimposed. An example of such objects is our left and right hand. According to a standard reading of this essay, Kant is giving an apagogic, i.e., an indirect argument. He is taken to argue for an absolutist, Newtonian conception of space by way of ruling out the Leibnizian alternative, according to which space comes down to relations among objects. Interpretations of this kind are given by Peter Remnant, John Earman, and Graham Nerlich, to name just a few. In this paper I argue for an alternative interpretation of Kant's argument. Instead of arguing for an absolutist conception by way of ruling out the Leibnizian alternative, I argue that Kant's claim is that the core idea of the Leibnizian conception, the idea of the situation [situs] of objects, presupposes space as an independent, three-dimensional whole. I make this point by focusing on two often neglected parts of the essay, a discussion of what Kant calls regions in space, and his explanation of how to construct the incongruent counterpart to an object such as a hand.
2. "How Sensibility's A Priori Form Matters" (draft available upon request)
In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant argues that our a priori cognition of objects does not only involve the faculty of understanding, that is, the faculty by means of which we can conceptualize objects. But he thinks that our sensibility, our faculty by means of which we can be affected by objects, contributes to our a priori cognition as well. Sensibility, he argues, has its own a priori structures, so-called forms. One of these forms is space. In this paper, I argue that the main difference space, as the form of sensibility, makes to our a priori cognition is that objects are conceptualized as parts of a common world. I argue that this is the point at which Kant deviates from especially from Leibniz's view. So Kant takes a world-first view, where Leibniz takes a substances-first view. I focus on a part of the Critique, commonly referred to as the Amphiboly, in which Kant contrasts his view of how we conceptualize objects to Leibniz's. Against the common interpretative approach, taken by, e.g., Derk Pereboom, which takes the conceptual pair of inner and outer as most central to Kant’s disagreement with Leibniz, I argue that the pair of matter and form provides the starting point of Kant’s criticism. I further draw on incongrunet counterparts in order to illustrate the kind of difference space as a whole makes, and why Kant sees the need for a world-first view.
3. "Grasping Incongruence: Kant's Argument in §13 of the Prolegomena"
In §13 of the Prolegomena Kant argues that incongruent counterparts pose a paradox for a view according to which space and time are qualities of things in themselves. He argues that a solution of this paradox requires that objects must be thought of as appearances. I reconstruct Kant's argument drawing on the way in which he contrasts his model of cognition to Leibniz's in the Amphiboly. I argue that incongruent counterparts pose a paradox for a view according to which the intellect is the sole faculty of cognition because such a view conceptualizes the objects as being independent of one another. And I motivate Kant's solution, which says that the inner determination of such objects is only possible through their outer relation to space, as saying that our grasp of the difference between a left and a right hand reveals the need for a model according to which objects are conceptualized as parts of a common world, and that this is ensured by taking our understanding to be conditioned by space as the form of our sensibility.
4. "Kant's Conception of Form in the Inaugural Dissertation"
Drawing on two of Kant's pre-critical writings, his Nova Dilucidatio from 1755, and his essay The Only Possible Proof of the Existence of God from 1763, I argue that the conception of form that Kant puts forward in his Inaugural Dissertation from 1770 is intended to address one of the main issues he sees in Leibniz's philosophy. According to Leibniz's conception of substances, objects cannot genuine interact with one anohter and form a real unity. Any appearance of such a relation and unity is merely due to a pre-established harmony. In trying to work out a conception of substances and their origin that makes possible the formers' actual outward relatability and true unity, I explain how Kant's conception of form grows out of the attempt to address this problem.
5. "Against the Leibnizians: Euler and Kant on Absolute Space"
In a short essay from 1748, Euler argues for an absolutist conception of space. The basis for his argument is Newton's first law of mechanics, the law of inertia. A few years later, in an essay from 1768, Kant also argues for an absolutist conception of space. But Kant bases his argument on more geometrical considerations. In this essay Kant comments on Euler's argument saying that although Euler points to a difficulty with the major alternative conception to the Newtonian one, namely the Leibnizian conception, Euler's argument fails as it leaves unconsidered the difficulties that come with the application of the laws of motion in the concrete. In this paper I compare Euler's and Kant's arguments and argue that Kant's argument accomplishes where he sees Euler's argument failing.
Upcoming:
• Kant’s Conception of Form in the Inaugural Dissertation, Berkeley-Stanford Graduate Workshop on Kant’s Philosophy, UC Berkeley, May 2025
• Constructing A Counterpart, NAKS Biennale, Montreal, October 2025
Past:
• How Sensibility’s Form Matters, Rackham Interdisciplinary Workshop in Early Modern Philosophy, UMichigan, Ann Arbor, April 2025
• Kant’s Conception of Form in the Inaugural Dissertation, Berkeley History of Philosophy, UC Berkeley, April 2025
• Repetition, Reproduction, Working Group with Alva Noë, UC Berkeley, March 2025
• How Sensibility’s Form Matters, Graduate Student Colloquium, UC Berkeley, December 2024
• How Sensibility’s Form Matters, Workshop on Kant and Hegel, Stanford, November 2024 (invited)
• How Sensibility’s Form Matters, PhilForum, UC Berkeley, October 2024 (invited)
• Constructing a Counterpart, Working Group with Alva Noë, UC Berkeley, October 2024
• Comments on I. Romero’s Do Inaccuracies Matter in Fiction, Berkeley-London Graduate Conference, UCL, May 2024
• Kant’s Criticism of Leibniz in the Amphiboly, Dissertation Seminar, UC Berkeley, Spring 2024
• Kant’s Criticism of Leibniz in the Amphiboly, PhilGem, UC Berkeley, November 2023
• Kant’s Criticism of Leibniz in the Amphiboly, Central APA, Denver, Symposium, February 2023
• Constructing a Counterpart, Dissertation Seminar, UC Berkeley, Fall 2022
• Reproduction One and Two, Working Group with Alva Noë, UC Berkeley, Fall 2022
• Conscience in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, Guest Lecture for A. Novakovic’s course on Hegel, UC Berkeley, Spring 2022
• Kant’s Conception of Space, PhilForum, UC Berkeley, Fall 2021 (invited)
• Kant’s Account of Beauty and Contemporary Art, PhilForum, UC Berkeley, Spring 2021 (invited)
• Kant’s Account of Beauty and Contemporary Art, Wollheim Society, UC Berkeley, Spring 2021
• Carnap’s Problem for the Intuitionistic Propositional Calculus, Haifa Logic Group, University of Haifa, Summer 2018
• Quantifying Epistemic Value, 2nd Munich Graduate Workshop, LMU Munich, Summer 2016
Upcoming:
• Aesthetics (for Joseph Kassman-Tod), Summer 2025
Current:
• Modern Philosophy (for Kristin Primus), Spring 2025
Past:
As Primary Instructor at UC Berkeley:
• Individual Morality and Social Justice, Summer 2022
• Individual Morality and Social Justice, Summer 2021
As Graduate Student Instructor at UC Berkeley:
• Ancient Philosophy (for John MacFarlane), Fall 2024
• Phenomenology (for Joseph Kassman-Tod), Summer 2024
• Metaphysics (for Geoff Lee), Spring 2024
• Philosophical Methods (for Geoff Lee), Fall 2023
• Modern Philosophy (for Kristin Primus), Spring 2023
• Heidegger (for Katharina Kaiser), Fall 2022
• Hegel (for Andreja Novakovic), Spring 2022
• Feminism and Philosophy (for Olivia Bailey), Fall 2021
• Kant (for Daniel Warren), Spring 2021
• Aesthetics (for Alva Noë), Fall 2020
• Introduction to Logic (for Wes Holliday), Summer 2019
• Leibniz (for Tim Crockett), Spring 2019
• Ancient Philosophy (for Tim Clarke), Fall 2018
• Introduction to Logic (for Wes Holliday), Summer 2018
• Knowledge and its Limits (for Wes Holliday), Spring 2018
• Individual Morality and Social Justice (for Hans Sluga), Fall 2017
• Introduction to Logic (for Richard Lawrence), Summer 2018